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Université catholique de Louvain, BELGIUMWhatever Happened to Social Dialogue?
From Partnership to Managerialism in the
EU Employment AgendaABSTRACT ■ There has been a major bifurcation in the level and form of social
dialogue between employers and unions within the EU. The intersectoral 
and sectoral social dialogue launched by the Val Duchesse process in 1985
now runs in parallel with domestic forms that are merely reacting to agendas
established by the Commission and the Council. This article, based on 
interviews with employer, union and government representatives across six EU
member states, argues that the European Employment Strategy is converting
social dialogue into a managerialist process by decentralizing it to national
level and co-opting the social partners into taking responsibility for meeting
employment targets over which they have had no influence.
KEYWORDS: European employment strategy ■ managerialism
■ open method of coordination ■ social dialogue ■ social partnerstroduction
ne central element of the ‘European social model’ has been the inclusion
f the social partners in the development of policies and initiatives at EU
vel. Under this model, trade unions, employers and public sector
rganizations have engaged in a range of participatory processes, including
 recent years the formulation of directives across a variety of social and
ployment areas. Some commentators (Lecher et al., 2002) have claimed
at this is a new form of policymaking that contributes to a unique
uropean path that can simultaneously combine economic progress with
cial involvement. Since the Maastricht Treaty and, more recently, the
ssen and Lisbon Councils, social dialogue has been consolidated in all
cial policy formation and implementation.
Social dialogue according to the Commission (EC, 2002b: 4) ‘is the
riving force behind successful economic and social reforms’ and must be
bedded at different levels of EU activity. In particular, social partnerDOI: 10.1177/0959680107073963
involvement is described as central to the emerging ‘open method of coor-
dination’ (OMC), defined by the Lisbon Council as: the use of common
EU-wide guidelines, timetables and goals; the use of indicators and
benchmarks; the translation of EU guidelines into national and regional
policies, taking differences between the member states into account; and
monitoring, evaluation and peer review (Council, 2000: para. 1.18.37).
The European Employment Strategy (EES) is the first European process
where all four of these elements are applied and roles are assigned to the
social partners, especially in relation to monitoring, evaluation and peer
review (De la Porte and Pochet, 2003). In the EES, the participation of social
partners at European and national levels is considered an important feature
of the ‘governance’ of the process. This has been stated from the outset, and
was reasserted in the presentation of the Employment Guidelines for the
period 2005–08: ‘Member States should ensure good governance of
employment policies. They should establish a broad partnership for change
by involving parliamentary bodies and stakeholders … European and
national social partners should play a central role’ (Council, 2005a: 23).
This article traces the evolution of social dialogue at EU level and exam-
ines the extent to which it has fulfilled the claims made for it (EIRO, 2005;
Kok, 2003; Zeitlin et al., 2005). It argues that social dialogue at EU level
reached its greatest influence with the introduction of the ‘negotiation
track’ in the Maastricht social chapter, which allows the Commission to
create directives (binding legislation) out of agreements concluded by the
European social partners. However, the EES places emphasis on national
levels of social partner involvement, which can be considered ‘decentral-
ized’ from a European point of view, but which correspond to a broadly
corporatist type of national cross-industry and tripartite dialogue.
Involvement in the EES is therefore dependent on national institutions and
practices, whereas beforehand the social dialogue relied on the willingness
of social partners at EU level to create their own ‘space’. The Stockholm
summit in March insisted that ‘success … requires commitment from
employers and workers at the grass roots’ (Council, 2001c: para. 1.18.30,
emphasis added).
An evaluation of the role of social dialogue in the OMC therefore
requires analysis of its impact both at EU level and within each member
state, where responsibility lies for the delivery of the EES.
Emergence of Social Dialogue at EU Level
There are many accounts of the evolution and significance of EU social
dialogue (De Boer et al., 2005; Keller and Platzer, 2003; Keller and Sörries,
1999; Teague, 1999). From the 1980s onwards, the Commission recog-
nized that the development of a European industrial relations area
European Journal of Industrial Relations 13(1)
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required, first that there should be ‘strong and capable social partners’
who are European in their conception and administration of policy; and
second, that the social dialogue should be deepened and extended to act as
a regulatory instrument enabling the ‘harmonization of employment and
working conditions’ (EC, 1988: 88–9) alongside other regulations and
directives. The discussions which took place before the 1989 Social
Charter and the 1991 Maastricht Treaty acknowledged the obstacles to
harmonizing conditions across the heterogeneous systems of industrial
relations in the member states. Nor was there any conception of how
social partner regulation could bear upon existing national levels of col-
lective agreement. However, social dialogue was considered important,
first as an institution-building process necessary as a precursor to any
European industrial relations system, and second as a potential joint regu-
latory procedure alongside other more centralized and legalistic forms.
These functions of social dialogue were reinforced by the social protocol
of the Maastricht Treaty, consolidated as the social chapter of the
Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. The social partners were then drawn into two
related variants of social dialogue, one involving what was termed the
‘negotiation track’ and the other ‘autonomous’ or ‘voluntary agreements’.
Both are based on Article 139 of the Treaty;1 according to the Commission,
‘the social partners’ right to be consulted on proposals in the social field
and their option to request that matters be dealt with by agreement rather
than legislation brought them to the centre of the European social stage’
(EC, 2002a: 17).
Under the first track, the Commission consults the social partners over
the topics for negotiation, and Community institutions subsequently inter-
vene, at the Commission’s initiative, only if there is failure to agree. Since
1993 the social partners have been directly consulted 12 times in this way
(EC, 2004). The outcome may be independent social dialogue, at intersec-
toral or sectoral levels, and ultimately agreements which may establish
minimum standards to be incorporated into Community law. Intersectoral
framework agreements implemented by means of directives have covered
parental leave (1995); part-time work (1997); working time in sea transport
(1998); fixed-term contracts (1999); mobile workers in civil aviation (2000);
and working conditions of mobile workers in cross-border services (2004).
Furthermore, since the Laeken Declaration (2001) the social partners
have placed greater emphasis on bipartite ‘autonomous agreements’.
These are negotiated without any intervention from the Commission, and
implemented either by collective agreement in the member states or by
Council Decision on request from the social partners (EC, 2003). Two
such agreements have been concluded, the first in 2002 on telework and
the second in 2004 on work-related stress.
The Commission has thus been cementing its aim of creating ‘strong and
capable social partners’ within new regulatory instruments. The main
Gold et al.: Whatever Happened to Social Dialogue?
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thrust has been an attempt to strengthen workers’ rights, linking back to
the Commission’s traditional approach to social and employment policy in
the 1970s of building strong industrial relations institutions and represen-
tative bodies within a developing European area of employment relations.
However, the results have sometimes been contested (De Boer et al., 2005),
and the processes remain partly dependent on the Commission. In recent
years, the flow of its proposals has also declined as the ‘shadow of the law’
has faded (Falkner, 2003).
The Open Method of Coordination: A New Form of
Managerialism?
Priorities soon changed from greater employee rights to employment cre-
ation (Gold et al., 2000). The 1993 White Paper Growth, Competitiveness
and Employment (EC, 1993) stressed the role of training, flexibility and
work re-organization in reducing the level of unemployment; while the
December 1994 Essen Council recommended, amongst other measures,
that member states should give greater weight to active labour market
policies and target groups particularly at risk of unemployment (Council,
1994: para. 1.3).
The Luxembourg summit in November 1997 inaugurated a new form of
policymaking by introducing the EES (Goetschy, 1999). Under the terms
of the ‘Luxembourg process’, each member state was required to draw up
an annual National Action Plan (NAP) for employment. Over the first five
cycles of the EES, from 1998/9 to 2002/3, each NAP had a standardized
format, with four ‘pillars’ (employability, entrepreneurialism, adaptability
and equal opportunities) each subdivided into some 20 more detailed
guidelines. In 2001 they were supplemented by six ‘horizontal objectives’
which incorporated the Lisbon targets noted below. The EES has since
undergone successive reforms, notably in 2003 when the number of guide-
lines was reduced and the link with the Lisbon objectives reinforced, along
with the introduction of detailed quantitative targets and benchmarks. The
system was simplified, and the pillars and guidelines were streamlined into
the so-called ‘ten commandments’ (Watt, 2004). In 2005, the strategy was
again revisited by the Commission and Council. There are now only eight
guidelines, defined for the period 2005–08. According to institutional texts
(Council, 2005a), employment policies are more integrated with macro-
economic and microeconomic policies. Nevertheless, the philosophy that
underpins the Luxembourg process remains intact, with its reliance on
common guidelines, indicators, decentralization and evaluation.
This system depends for its implementation on a process that was later –
at Lisbon, in 2000 – to become known as the OMC. This consisted of a
decentralized but coordinated process, which had grown out of the broad
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economic policy guidelines that governed the introduction of Economic
and Monetary Union (Hodson and Maher, 2001). Its application to
employment policy can be traced to the 1994 Essen Council, which called
on member states to transpose its conclusions into policy through ‘multi-
annual programmes’ (Council, 1994: para. 1.3). A variety of policy areas
were soon integrated through the use of OMC, including employment,
creation of the information society, research policy, social inclusion and
pensions, with each accompanied by appropriate benchmarks. The OMC
has been increasingly used to coordinate policy areas that are regarded as
particularly complex, delicate and institutionally embedded at national level
(Borrás and Jacobsson, 2004; De la Porte and Pochet, 2003; Goetschy, 2005;
Scott and Trubek, 2002; Zeitlin et al., 2005.)
Since the inauguration of the Luxembourg process, EU social policy
has targeted ‘the promotion of employment’ (Article 136), with goals and
benchmarks set by the Commission and Council (the social partners have
not been involved in target-setting). The Lisbon Council of March 2000
set a 10-year strategy for ‘boosting employment, economic reform and
social cohesion within the framework of a knowledge-based economy’
(Council, 2000: para. 1.1), specifying a target 70 percent employment rate
across the EU by 2010.
The OMC, then, entails target-setting, and its implementation redirects
social dialogue away from means – the establishment of procedures and
processes – and towards goals involving targets across a range of indica-
tors. In this sense, the redirection moves away from the principle of
autonomy of bargaining and towards a form of managerialism that has
been prevalent in the UK, especially in relation to new forms of public
sector management. There, improvements in efficiency and quality were
to be procured by close scrutiny of performance and enhanced monitor-
ing of newly created benchmarks (Cutler and Waine, 2000). The parallel
in European terms is the integration of multiple policies into the OMC,
with multiple benchmarks. It applies, as noted above, to many fields of
interest to the social partners, including employment, social inclusion and
pensions. Officially the social partners make a dual contribution to this
process: ‘on the guidelines and the process itself, the social partners are
regularly consulted … on the content, the social partners are sometimes in
a position to provide responses to guidelines determined in the context of
the open coordination method. This is particularly relevant as regards
employment …’ (EC, 2002a: 14–5).
The annual Tripartite Summit for Growth and Employment, held for
the first time in 2003, reflects the same principle of consultation with
social partners at European level: it aims at ‘exchanging views’ and exam-
ining social partners’ contribution to achieving the Lisbon objectives, but
it does not set its own agenda or engage in establishing the objectives
themselves.
Gold et al.: Whatever Happened to Social Dialogue?
11
007-026 EJD-073963.qxd  3/2/07  4:26 PM  Page 11
To what extent have these changes strengthened or weakened the social
dialogue? Developments so far show that in the OMC the domestic
intersectoral level has been privileged and that, whilst there are claims for
‘a central role’ (Council, 2005a: 23) for social partners, these remain at the
periphery of the process. The new phase signals a change in both the level
and the form of social dialogue, shifting to a national arena supported by
a managerialist agenda. The first five-year period of the Luxembourg
process provides a convenient and self-contained timeframe for analysing
this and the extent of those changes in the different national settings.
The Luxembourg Process: A New Variant of Social
Dialogue
The OMC has, then, brought about a new phase in the social dialogue. The
negotiation track and the option for ‘autonomous agreements’ run along-
side, it is true, and remain influenced by a Commission-led agenda.
Nevertheless, the OMC variant of social dialogue involves a change in level,
in that the social partners in each member state are requested to advise,
consult and possibly negotiate on the ways to achieve labour market targets
agreed by the Council, which unambiguously sets the agenda. From an
existing ‘option to request that matters be dealt with by agreement rather
than legislation’ (EC, 2002a: 17), and therefore the chance of a vital role in
the governance of the EU through early involvement in key European
issues, the role of the social partners in the EES has been greatly down-
graded. They have no part whatever to play in the setting of the various
guidelines, pillars and targets in the EES, and their participation has been
moved ‘downstream’ to national level, where they are merely expected to
implement the policy that has been established well ‘upstream’.
Yet the Luxembourg summit had underlined the role of the social dia-
logue in the NAP process: ‘the social partners at all levels will be involved
in all stages of this approach [the drawing up of the NAPs] and will have
their contribution to make to the implementation of the guidelines. That
contribution will be regularly assessed’ (Council, 1997: para. 1.4.18). The
clear implications here are that the social partners would be involved at
both EU and national levels in a forward-looking strategy on employment,
with regular evaluation of their input.
The evaluation of social partner involvement has been critical. The
Commission, for example, observed that the ‘social partners’ commit-
ment to the NAPs process varies from one member state to another’. In
relation to modernizing work organization, it noted that ‘their relative
absence … in the EES process has clearly to be seen as one of the weak
features of the strategy’. Overall, it concludes that lack of social partner
involvement has been a ‘weak spot’ of the EES (EC, 2002b: 14, 27, 40).
European Journal of Industrial Relations 13(1)
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Furthermore, in the Joint Employment Report 2004/05, the Council
implicitly recognizes that consultation, rather that real participation, is
the rule. ‘The European Council called on Member States to establish
partnerships for reforms. While partnership approaches exist in many
Member States, Ireland was the only one to cite the establishment of
reform partnerships in its NAP’ (Council, 2005b: 19).
The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) has been similarly
concerned. In a questionnaire circulated to its members in 2002 it asked:
‘have your public authorities developed a comprehensive partnership for
implementing and monitoring the EES?’ (ETUC, 2002). The variation in
response was striking. The Belgian FGTB-ABVV, for example, replied
that work on the EES was carried out in the bipartite National Labour
Council, whilst the Danish FTF stated that there had been ongoing con-
sultation over the incorporation of social partner contributions to the
NAP in 2002, and some had been accepted. In Germany, the ministries
responsible have involved the DGB by sending it provisional draft texts
of the NAP in good time and allowing it the chance to propose additions
and amendments. The French CFDT and the Spanish CC.OO., by con-
trast, replied that there was no such partnership, and the British TUC
commented that involvement was ad hoc as there were no institutional
arrangements designed to bring the government and social partners to-
gether. Partly as a result of these concerns, a conference on the theme
Contribution des partenaires sociaux was convened in February 2002 for
social partners from 12 member states to discuss employment-friendly
practices. It subsequently led to an EU-wide network of national social
partners involved in their countries’ NAPs, but an assessment of its activ-
ities is not available (EIRO, 2002).
More recently, the ETUC published a report on trade union evaluation
of the EES (Homs et al., 2005). The unions concluded that the EES had
usefully given increased political visibility to employment issues and had
defined objectives, allowing an assessment of the progress made. However,
in their critique, they underlined the prevalence of institutional relation-
ships between the national governments and the Commission with little
space for ‘co-responsibility’ with social partners.
European unions and employers have also joined forces to produce a
common evaluation. In 2004, ETUC, UNICE/UEAPME and CEEP
issued a ‘Report on Social Partners’ Actions in Member States to Implement
Employment Guidelines’ (ETUC et al., 2004). Their observations covered
14 of the EU-15 countries. In only four has there been participation, while
in the 10 others consultation has taken place but with little impact. The way
in which the question was formulated, focusing on the role of the social
partners in the ‘implementation’ of the guidelines is, as such, indicative of
the mainly reactive role that national unions and employer organizations
play in the EES.
Gold et al.: Whatever Happened to Social Dialogue?
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Social Partner Involvement: Dynamics at Play
In an attempt to analyse in greater detail the involvement of the social
partners in these processes, this article presents the findings of a project
carried out in 2002–3 and funded by the UK Economic and Social
Research Council (see the Acknowledgements and also Casey, 2005). 
It focused on six member states, selected according to their contrasting
levels of labour market participation. Greece, Spain and Belgium (55.5,
57.7 and 59.9 percent respectively) can be regarded as ‘poor’ performers;
Ireland, the UK and Denmark (65.8, 71.7 and 76.2 percent) as ‘moderate’
or ‘high’ performers (Eurostat). They also have contrasting industrial rela-
tions systems, ranging between highly institutionalized traditions of
bipartite bargaining and tripartite concertation (Belgium, Denmark) to
the opposite (Greece, UK). Semi-structured interviews were carried out in
spring 2003, at the end of the first five-year EES evaluation period, with
representatives of the principal social partners and government officials
from the ministries of labour and social affairs, or their equivalents. An
attempt was made to explore perceived involvement in the annual NAP
cycles and its relationship with outcomes – that is, the extent to which the
level of social partner involvement could be associated with favourable
labour market results.
The social partners in this context are those organizations representing
employers and workers at national level in each member state. It is import-
ant to keep distinct the process of social dialogue at EU level – a creation of
the EU itself, and a genuinely pan-EU method of regulation – and the mul-
tiple processes of negotiation, consultation and information that take place
within the strictly national confines of each member state. The industrial
relations frameworks that structure such national systems of ‘social dia-
logue’ are immensely complex, with wide variations in scope, level and reg-
ulatory basis, depending on history and tradition (Ferner and Hyman,
1998; Van Ruysseveldt and Visser, 1996). Nevertheless, the success of the
EES largely rests on the performance of these national systems (EIRO,
2005). The efficient insertion of young people into the labour market, the
promotion of female employment and the retention of older workers in
paid work, for example, depend at least partly on the cooperation of the
social partners in ensuring the smooth operation of the systems designed to
achieve these objectives. Moreover, in many countries issues such as flexi-
bility, working time, and training and development are regulated mostly by
employers and unions at various levels of the industrial relations system.
Yet the social partners did not participate in any way in setting 
the targets adopted at the Lisbon and Stockholm summits. They were
adopted unilaterally by the Commission and subsequently by the
Council without reference to how practical or realistic they were in the
eyes of EU-level employers’ organizations or unions, the very parties
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subsequently responsible for implementing and monitoring them. In this
way, they were placed in a position of responsibility without power or
influence, and required to support the achievement of objectives over
which they had had no control. This point is significant as it reflects the
managerialist orientation of the EES. In the course of joint negotiations,
employers and unions are generally free to establish their own agendas,
timetables and work methods. However, the Luxembourg process has
removed this area of autonomy from the competence of the social part-
ners at national level, assuming that they will be prepared to participate
in a process over whose objectives they have had no say.
With these provisos, involvement can be examined in a variety of
different ways: for example, the stage at which the social partners are
involved in drawing up the NAP; the degree to which they are integrated
into the peer review processes; and the control that the government
exerts over methods of involvement. The following sections analyse these
various elements, but also examine the ways in which the social partners
are occasionally able to use the NAP process to their own advantage, by
focusing on those issues that most meet their current interests.
Implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the NAPs remain patchy,
and reflect variations in the capacity of diverse national systems of indus-
trial relations, but one of the principal problems with social partner
involvement is that the NAPs are still designed as compilations of
existing policies rather than as forward-looking strategic plans.
Stages of Involvement
The stages at which the social partners become involved in the NAP
process vary widely. In Spain, the employers’ confederation CEOE sub-
mitted written comments to the Ministry of Labour on the draft NAP,
and met officials, but described the procedures as ‘routine’. The Workers’
Commissions (CC.OO.) had not recorded any change over the five years
under review: union officers were sent the draft NAP for comment but
never met the Ministry of Labour for discussions, or the employers. The
government had amended the NAP in the light of comments, and a late
version was discussed, according to the Ministry of Labour, by the
Economic and Social Council (CES), but CC.OO. called for the oppor-
tunity to make comments before the first draft was written.
Similarly in Greece, the government used to send the social partners the
final draft of the NAP for their opinion, though changes were introduced
in 2002: the social partners were involved earlier and there were three
drafts before the final version. The government had created four working
groups on the NAP, one for each pillar, and the Federation of Greek
Industries (SEB) made submissions to each. In the UK, the Department
Gold et al.: Whatever Happened to Social Dialogue?
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for Work and Pensions (DWP) drafts the first version of the NAP, and its
status does not allow serious amendment. The Confederation of British
Industry (CBI) and the TUC are more involved towards the end, but the
TUC described the process as ‘a bit of a ritual’.
By contrast, the social partners are involved more coherently, and at
earlier stages, in Belgium, Ireland and Denmark. The first draft of the
Belgian NAP contains contributions from the regional governments and
social partners, as fed through the country’s bipartite National Labour
Council. However, the joint statement it issued in September 2003 evaluat-
ing the two-yearly intersectoral agreement stated that the then current
process was ‘opaque’ and that the social partners wanted greater involve-
ment in drawing up and monitoring the employment guidelines. In Ireland
the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (DETE) requests
information from the social partners under certain headings before it begins
to draft the NAP. It then produces a preliminary version, which is refined
as the social partners make further comments. Though they do not sign, the
social partners may append their own views. Similarly, the social partners
in Denmark make their own contributions to the NAP, which they submit
to the Ministry of Labour, which in turn drafts the NAP taking their views
into account. The government composes the final version, though the NAP
contains appendices with social partner contributions. The social partners
themselves stressed that there was a high degree of consensus in Denmark
on active labour market policy, which was discussed regularly on the then
national-level Labour Market Board.
Though social partners in all the countries covered criticized the lack
of time available to put the NAP together – a criticism that has been
taken into account in the revised versions of the EES introduced since
2003 – it is remarkable how diverse national procedures have proved in
involving them earlier or later. In some, and particularly in countries
where a tradition of tripartite consultation existed already before the
Luxembourg process, they participate at the earliest stages of drafting,
whilst in others they are merely shown the final draft for late comment.
Peer Review
Participation at the round of peer review meetings convened by the
Commission varies too. In the UK, the process is stage-managed, with a
pre-meeting between the government, CBI and TUC to decide who will
answer which points. The Greek government had asked the General
Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) to attend, along with three
employers’ organizations. SEB had attended only in 2002, and a special
advisor to the government described the questions raised at the meetings as
‘fixed’ in line with the Commission’s current agenda. The Danish
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Federation of Trade Unions (LO) saw little value in the follow-up bilateral
meetings with the Commission, and attended only for public relations pur-
poses with its members. The Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU)
refused to attend altogether – unlike the Irish Business and Employers’
Confederation (IBEC) – because neither the government nor the
Commission would pay their expenses. Attendance by the Spanish social
partners was also erratic: CEOE had gone in 2002 only to explain to the
Commission the role of temporary contracts in Spain. By contrast, Belgium
sent a large delegation to bilaterals: up to 30 people, representing federal and
regional government, political advisors to the Ministry of Labour, along
with the social partners themselves.
Overall, patterns of attendance vary, which may seem surprising given
the significance of the process for peer review. Attendance may be seen
as a ritual, or undertaken for public relations purposes. Not all social
partners go along every year, and some plan their contributions at pre-
meetings, whilst others do not. Some delegations are focused, whilst
others are inclusive.
Role of Government
Responsibility for the NAPs lies with the member states. In the UK, for
example, the DWP initiates the drafting process, and the Treasury, the
Department of Trade and Industry and the CBI and TUC are regarded as
‘strategic partners’. However, as one official stressed, ‘it’s our Secretary of
State who signs it off’. Partly as a consequence, two contentious points in
the UK NAP had never been resolved. Guideline One in 2001 had required
the offer of a job ‘before’ reaching six months of unemployment for young
unemployed and 12 months for adults (Council, 2001a: 21). This point was
stressed in the Council’s recommendations to the UK (Council, 2001b: 37),
though the DWP insisted it had no intention of altering its current policy,
the offer of a job ‘at’ six months. A year later, the Council recommended
that the UK should ‘further foster social partnership at the national level,
in particular to improve productivity and skills, and the modernization of
working life’ (Council, 2002: 80). The TUC supported the Commission on
both issues, but the DWP held its ground. Furthermore, the DWP itself
noted that its model for active labour market policy is drawn more from
the USA than from Europe, so attempts by the TUC to use ‘best practice’
from France and Germany tended to elicit the response: ‘but just look at
their unemployment’.
Indeed, other countries too have proved resistant to EU pressure when
key interests were at stake. The Council in its recommendations has criti-
cized both Belgium and Denmark on account of their failures to prevent
the early withdrawal of workers from work (Belgium: Council, 2001b: 29
Gold et al.: Whatever Happened to Social Dialogue?
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and 2002: 72; Denmark: Council, 2001b: 30). Nevertheless, the Belgian
intersectoral agreement for 2003–4 merely extended the existing rules on
early retirement for a further two years, and did not mention the age at
which workers became eligible for it (EIRR, 2003). Tensions during
autumn 2005 on the Belgian government’s ‘pact for solidarity between gen-
erations’, which aimed to restrict opportunities for early retirement, reveal
that there is clearly still no consensus on certain policy orientations defined
by the EES. Similarly in Denmark, the government led by the Social
Democrats lost the general election in November 2001 to a coalition led by
the Liberal Party, at least partly because of its attempts to reform early
retirement. The incoming government accordingly left the issue well alone.
Existing Policies
A further reason for lack of social partner influence over the NAP process
is that many of the policies incorporated into the NAP were already sched-
uled for introduction. CEOE argued that the Spanish NAPs did not affect
domestic industrial relations agendas, but rather that the domestic agendas
get incorporated into the annual NAP cycle. The Danish social partners
maintained that they produced the NAP every year only because the
Commission demanded it. They regarded it as a showcase for Danish active
labour market policies, as it told a ‘good story’. The NAPs may have helped
to stimulate policy, for example in the field of gender mainstreaming, but
they had not ‘caused’ it. The CBI and TUC expressed similar points. The
TUC maintained that key policies like the New Deal, lifelong learning, Job
Centres Plus and the promotion of Learning and Skills Councils through
the Regional Development Agencies would all have taken place without the
NAPs, whilst the CBI claimed that the UK government was doing ‘95 per-
cent of the NAP anyhow’.
The ICTU summarized by stating that the Irish NAPs were not ‘where
the action is’; they were a compilation of policies under way elsewhere,
and acted merely as a ‘sweeper’ for issues that might otherwise have been
overlooked (a point explored below). National priorities were covered in
the three-year intersectoral agreements, at the time entitled ‘Sustaining
Progress’ (2003–5). This included issues like lifelong learning, university
fees and learning leave, which were then integrated into the NAP, which
simply provided an opportunity for reflection. Activity also centres on the
National Development Plan and the monitoring committees of various
operational programmes, such as training. These activities feed through
into the NAPs, which are themselves, however, regarded as ‘second-line
mechanisms’.
Overall, the NAPs were regarded as backward-looking compilations of
policy, and not forward-looking strategic plans. They reflected the existing
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concerns of the social partners, whose strategic objectives were actually
focused elsewhere, notably on intersectoral bargaining in countries like
Belgium, Denmark and Ireland. This partly explains why social partners see
the process as somewhat ritualistic: it remains out of the scope of collective
bargaining and ‘real’ partnership, and governments are seen as more anx-
ious to receive a good report from the Commission than to engage in the
codetermination of labour market policies.
Pragmatism
Nevertheless, both governments and social partners do, on occasion,
exploit the opportunities presented by the NAP process when it suits
their purposes. The DETE in Ireland and the Ministry of Labour in
Belgium had used the NAP process to justify labour market activation
measures, and they also both stressed that it had helped them to introduce
an evaluation culture that made their officials more results-oriented.
The social partners too have often successfully picked up similar
opportunities, though these tended to cluster round ‘employability’ and
‘equal opportunities’. For example, the Greek social partners, who
finance the country’s public employment service, have lobbied for the
reform of the service – reform had long been one of their grievances – in
line with the Council’s recommendations. The Danish LO successfully
secured an agreement on the integration of ethnic minorities into the
labour market. In Ireland, the ICTU had raised the issue of lifelong
learning, particularly workplace learning for people lacking secondary
education, while both IBEC and ICTU had campaigned against the lack
of childcare facilities, in line with Council recommendations. Similarly,
CC.OO. in Spain gave directions to its affiliate unions to include gender
issues in their bargaining agendas. In these ways, NAPs have been used
as a resource by the social partners to underpin their own policies and
campaigns, though issues involving ‘entrepreneurship’ and ‘adaptability’
did not feature as prominently.
The impact of NAPs on domestic bargaining varies too. The TUC
claimed that in the UK it was ‘nil’ because bargaining is so decentralized.
In Greece, too, GSEE has wanted to place items raised by the NAPs –
notably labour flexibility, by which it means the reduction in the working
week – on bargaining agendas but ‘nothing has happened’. By contrast,
though it managed to raise gender mainstreaming at intersectoral level, the
issue had not yet percolated through to company-level agreements. Spain,
too, has had a series of intersectoral agreements covering items like atypi-
cal work and dismissals, which have been reflected in the NAPs, but there
is no constructive dialogue within the NAP process itself. Belgium has also
addressed certain issues raised by the Commission in its cycle of two-year
Gold et al.: Whatever Happened to Social Dialogue?
19
007-026 EJD-073963.qxd  3/2/07  4:26 PM  Page 19
intersectoral bargaining, and intervening sectoral bargaining, though con-
tentious issues – such as early retirement – may be fudged. In Denmark, the
unions have the strength to ensure compliance with agreements at all lev-
els, and the social partners there pointed out that the implementation of the
EES assumed the existence of structures that allowed or promoted the sys-
tematic cascade of appropriate policies to achieve the required targets. For
example, joint DA/LO statements on the quality or work had been fol-
lowed up promptly at plant level, in a way that could not be guaranteed in
more decentralized systems.
Conclusions
The position of social dialogue in Europe remains one of contrasts: the
older variants established by the Val Duchesse process persist and
develop, with policy initiatives and activity evolving at intersectoral 
and sectoral levels. At EU sector level, for instance, there are now more
than 30 social dialogue committees where discussions and negotiations
take place.2 Running parallel, and with little impact on these processes, 
is the social dialogue analysed in the latter sections of this article.
Reliance on decentralized, national procedures has resulted from the shift
towards the employment agenda heralded especially by the Luxembourg
and Lisbon processes. The predominance of employment creation, the
search for global competitiveness and the holy grail of labour flexibility
are all encountered in the new policy agenda set by the EES. With it has
come a new approach to social dialogue, a variant that differs from the
style of social dialogue encountered previously.
This article has argued that there has been a decisive shift in the level and
form of social dialogue since the Essen Council and the subsequent intro-
duction of the OMC. In the EES, the location of social dialogue has been
redirected away from the EU intersectoral and sectoral levels towards
‘decentralization’ at the national level. This means that the domestic form
of social dialogue implied by the EES is increasingly distinct from the
intersectoral and sectoral kind at EU level, and has become entirely reac-
tive to an agenda set elsewhere. Whereas the social dialogue at EU level
allows the social partners to focus on the issues important to them, at
national level they merely share responsibility for the implementation of a
whole series of targets set elsewhere within the EES. This is a much
reduced form of collaboration, where social partners appear to be co-opted
into a process beyond their influence. They do not participate in the deter-
mination of the objective, as ‘partnership’ has been reduced largely to a
managerialist façade.
Whilst the ‘social dialogue’ remains the same in name and on the surface,
its content and politics are now very different. The rhetoric of social
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dialogue within the EES is not matched by the reality. Despite the efforts
of the Commission and the Council to place the social dialogue at centre
stage of the Luxembourg process, the social partners are not systematically
involved in all stages of the NAP process, or even in the peer review.
What is left to the social partners in the EES is an involvement that
depends on pragmatism, that is, participation in the NAP process insofar
it fits in with existing domestic agendas even though it barely affects these
agendas. Furthermore, the process does not challenge existing national
structures and traditions of participation in the member states. For
instance, the UK ignored the Council recommendation issued in 2002 to
introduce systems of social dialogue, and relies instead on institutional
practices that remain suspiciously traditional. The evidence reveals that
social partners in all countries are prepared to comply with targets and
recommendations as long as they do not challenge existing practices and
traditions. Where the chance existed that such targets and recommenda-
tions could make a difference, for example, in the case of the treatment of
older workers, then the social partners either ignored them or at best cre-
atively complied with the terms laid down. Much of this pragmatism
stemmed from the fact that the partners were not involved strategically in
the setting of targets and in deciding the processes to monitor them. The
NAP process instead revolved round the compilation of active labour mar-
ket polices that were generally already in existence. Despite the possibility
of peer pressure, governments are able to resist the Council recommenda-
tions that do not meet their own priorities, which demonstrates the clear
limits to peer pressure. Our article has also revealed the mismatch between
the levels of target-setting and achievement of the ‘central role’ that the
Council has claimed for the social partners. Because of widely varying
institutional and legal structures across the member states, their capacity to
meet the targets varies enormously. Indeed, at national level, there is a great
degree of variety in terms of involvement, vitality and inclusiveness.
Such variety calls into question not only the capacity of the member
states to transform European objectives into domestic practices, but also,
in the long term, the legitimacy of the process itself. Weak social partner
participation may result in increasing resistance to the process, especially if
EU recommendations to national governments on issues such as flexibility,
active ageing and employability become more and more urgent for gov-
ernments, while the social partners – or some of them – remain reluctant
to modify existing compromises and arrangements governing these areas.
How, then, might the social partners’ involvement in the NAP process
become strategic? The success of the EES and meeting the Lisbon targets
depends on the capacity of the social partners to mobilize in their support.
However, very few of the social partners interviewed indicated any grass-
roots support for the process, its aims or its outcomes. Whilst the targets
remain set at EU level by the Commission and Council, such a top-down
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approach is unlikely to enthuse the grass roots. At the very least, social
partners should be involved in setting the targets in the achievement of
which they are so heavily implicated.
Finally, without some transparent mechanism for the involvement of
democratic institutions, this form of managerialism will prevail: one that
empties social dialogue of its social mission, renders it apolitical and
reduces it to nothing more than a technical procedure. The OMC
recently entered a period of re-evaluation, the outcome of which was a
reduction in the number of horizontal and vertical indicators from
around 20 to eight. However useful such a simplification might be, the
question remains: is it addressing the fundamental flaws underlying this
weak form of social dialogue?
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